USA v. Jerome Hines by unknown
2010 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
12-14-2010 
USA v. Jerome Hines 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2010 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Jerome Hines" (2010). 2010 Decisions. 12. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2010/12 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2010 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 09-4616 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
      v. 
 
JEROME HINES, 
 
Appellant 
                          
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 2-08-cr-0133-001) 
 
District Judge: Honorable Dennis M. Cavanaugh 
                          
 
Argued 
October 7, 2010  
 
Before: FUENTES, JORDAN and ALDISERT, 
 
Circuit 
Judges 
(Opinion Filed: December 14, 2010) 
 
2 
Richard Coughlin 
Federal Public Defender 
District of New Jersey 
 
Louise Arkel (ARGUED) 
Lisa M. Mack 
1002 Broad Street, Fourth Floor 
Newark, New Jersey 07102 
Attorneys for Appellant 
 
Paul J. Fishman 
United States Attorney 
District of New Jersey 
 
George S. Leone 
Steven G. Sanders (ARGUED) 
Assistant United States Attorneys 
970 Broad Street 
Newark, New Jersey 07102-2535 
Attorneys for Appellee 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALDISERT, Circuit Judge
Jerome Hines appeals from a jury conviction for the 
offense of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), as well as from the 
sentence imposed by the District Court for the District of 
New Jersey. He presents two issues for our consideration. 
First, he challenges as an abuse of discretion the District 
Court’s denial of his pretrial request for an evidentiary 
.
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hearing to determine the events leading up to his arrest. 
Second, he contends that the District Court misapplied the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines” or 
“U.S.S.G.”) when it counted in his criminal history score four 
prior convictions under New Jersey Statute § 2C:33-2.1(b). 
Because Hines did not make the case for an evidentiary 
hearing, and because the District Court correctly applied the 
Guidelines, we will affirm its rulings in both respects. 
I. 
In October of 2007, Police Officers Angel Romero and 
Jay Small were patrolling Newark, New Jersey, in a police 
car. According to Romero’s later police report, the two were 
near the corner of Orange and Nesbitt Streets when one or 
both of the officers saw Hines—who was about 60 feet 
away—place a handgun into his left jacket pocket. They then 
saw Hines walk along Orange Street and enter a liquor store. 
Because Small was busy with two people he had detained on 
an unrelated matter, Romero used his cellular telephone to 
call Officer William Johnson, who came to the corner of 
Orange and Nesbitt Streets. When Johnson arrived, he and 
Romero entered the liquor store, approached Hines, and 
patted his left jacket pocket. When Romero felt what he 
believed was a weapon, the two officers threw Hines to the 
floor, placed him in handcuffs, and removed from his pocket 
a loaded semi-automatic handgun. 
In February of 2008, a federal grand jury returned a 
one-count indictment charging Hines with possession of a 
firearm as a convicted felon. Before trial, Hines filed a 
document captioned “Motion to Suppress of Jerome Hines,” 
which alleged that the police reports of his arrest were 
ambiguous and inconsistent, but which did not actually 
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request suppression of any item of evidence. Rather, the body 
of the document requested an evidentiary hearing and 
explained that if a hearing were held, and if sufficient facts 
were to emerge at the hearing, Hines would move to suppress 
the handgun “[a]t that point.” (App. 24.) Page two of the 
motion also included a footnote stating that the contents of 
the police reports from Hines’s arrest were “assumed to be 
true for the purposes of this motion”—i.e., the “Motion to 
Suppress of Jerome Hines.” (App. 15.) The government 
opposed the motion, arguing that because Hines’s footnote 
made the reports’ factual contents undisputed, and because 
those contents established probable cause to arrest Hines, 
there was no basis for an evidentiary hearing regarding 
suppression. Hines filed a reply letter to which he attached a 
short affidavit, the contents of which tended to refute the 
police reports. The District Court denied Hines’s request for a 
hearing and admitted the handgun into evidence. In April of 
2009, a jury found Hines guilty. 
At sentencing, the District Court calculated Hines’s 
Guidelines range to be 92 to 115 months’ imprisonment, 
based upon a final offense level of 24 and a criminal history 
category of V. It based this calculation in part on four of 
Hines’s five prior convictions for violating New Jersey 
Statute § 2C:33-2.1(b), which makes it a misdemeanor to 
loiter in a public place with intent to obtain or distribute a 
controlled substance. The Court imposed a sentence of 92 
months. Hines’s timely appeal challenges the District Court’s 
denial of an evidentiary hearing and the District Court’s 
decision to include his prior convictions in calculating his 
criminal history score. 
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II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231, because Hines was charged with offenses against the 
United States. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 
and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(2). 
III. 
We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s 
denial of an evidentiary hearing on a motion to suppress. See, 
e.g., In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in East 
Africa, 552 F.3d 157, 165 (2d Cir. 2008) (“The denial of a 
defendant’s request for a suppression hearing is reviewed for 
abuse of discretion.”); United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 
620 (9th Cir. 2000) (“We review for an abuse of discretion a 
court’s decision whether to conduct an evidentiary hearing on 
a motion to suppress.”); United States v. Glass, 128 F.3d 
1398, 1408-09 (10th Cir. 1997) (“We review a trial court’s 
denial of an evidentiary hearing on a motion to suppress for 
abuse of discretion.”); cf. United States v. Brink
We review de novo a district court’s interpretation of 
the Guidelines, 
, 39 F.3d 419, 
425 (3d Cir. 1994) (requiring a hearing where a defendant 
stated a colorable claim that evidence should be suppressed).  
United States v. Mateo, 560 F.3d 152, 154 (3d 
Cir. 2009), and we review for clear error the factual findings 
that underpin a district court’s application of the Guidelines, 
United States v. McQuilkin, 97 F.3d 723, 727 (3d Cir. 1996). 
The meaning of “loitering,” as used in the Guidelines, is a 
question of law subject to plenary review. See id.; see also 
United States v. Lock, 466 F.3d 594, 597-98 (7th Cir. 2006). 
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IV. 
Hines contends first that the District Court should have 
held an evidentiary hearing before ruling on his document 
titled “Motion to Suppress of Jerome Hines.” We begin by 
pausing to clarify what a defendant must show before a 
motion to suppress evidence requires an evidentiary hearing. 
Such rulings are ordinarily committed to a district court’s 
sound discretion, which we reverse only in rare 
circumstances. Because we conclude that Hines did not make 
the requisite showing, we will affirm the District Court. 
Rule 12(b)(3)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure permits defendants to file “motions to suppress 
evidence” before trial, but evidentiary hearings on such 
motions are not granted as a matter of course. See Rule 12(c) 
(the court “may” schedule a motion hearing). To require a 
hearing, a suppression motion must raise “issues of fact 
material to the resolution of the defendant’s constitutional 
claim.” United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1067 (3d Cir. 
1996). A motion to suppress requires an evidentiary hearing 
only if the motion is sufficiently specific, non-conjectural, 
and detailed to enable the court to conclude that (1) the 
defendant has presented a colorable constitutional claim, and 
(2) there are disputed issues of material fact that will affect 
the outcome of the motion to suppress. See id. at 1067 
(stating a claim is “colorable” if it consists “of more than 
mere bald-faced allegations of misconduct”); Brink, 39 F.3d 
at 424 (requiring an evidentiary hearing when a defendant 
states a colorable claim that the government obtained 
evidence by violating his constitutional rights). At bottom, the 
purpose of an evidentiary hearing in the context of a 
suppression motion is to assist the court in ruling upon a 
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defendant’s specific allegations of unconstitutional conduct—
its purpose is not to assist the moving party in making 
discoveries that, once learned, might justify the motion after 
the fact. To require an evidentiary hearing, a defendant’s 
suppression motion therefore must set forth and identify for 
the court specific and concrete “issues of fact material to the 
resolution of the defendant’s constitutional claim.” Voigt
In this case, Hines’s motion did not state a claim, raise 
a material fact, or dispute the government’s version of events. 
Given these failures, the District Court acted within its 
discretion in denying an evidentiary hearing. 
, 89 
F.3d at 1067. 
A. 
First, Hines’s motion did not raise a constitutional 
claim. To raise a constitutional claim in a motion to suppress 
evidence, a defendant must state that a violation occurred and 
allege facts that, if true, would support a finding that the 
evidence in question was obtained in violation of the 
defendant’s constitutional rights. Brink, 39 F.3d at 424 
(remanding for a hearing because Brink alleged facts that, if 
true, “could violate a defendant’s rights under the Sixth 
Amendment”). To satisfy this standard, a defendant’s motion 
must identify a constitutional violation at the outset and 
connect it to the evidence in question; bare assertions that an 
as-yet unidentified violation may have occurred, without 
more, will not suffice. See United States v. Coleman
Hines’s motion did not make the required showing. 
Although captioned a “Motion to Suppress of Jerome Hines,” 
it did not request suppression of anything at all. Rather, it 
, 149 
F.3d 674, 677 (7th Cir. 1998). 
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requested an evidentiary hearing for the sole purpose of 
determining the events leading to Hines’s arrest. Hines 
apparently hoped that during the hearing he might make 
discoveries that would later permit him to contend that the 
arresting officers violated his constitutional rights: 
. . . Jerome Hines respectfully requests that a hearing 
beheld [sic] . . . . It is only with a hearing that the 
events surrounding his arrest can be clarified. . . . At 
that point, Mr. Hines will request that the weapon 
allegedly seized be suppressed and that the indictment 
then be dismissed. 
(App. 23-24 (“Motion to Suppress of Jerome Hines”).) 
Nowhere did Hines’s motion allege a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment; he merely speculated that he might 
discover one if the facts were “clarified.” And nowhere did 
Hines’s motion ask the District Court to suppress evidence; 
he merely indicated he might make such a request in the 
future. His uncertain speculation fell short of stating a 
constitutional claim because he did not actually “allege[] facts 
that, if true, could violate [his] rights.” Voigt, 89 F.3d at 1067 
(citing Brink, 39 F.3d at 424). Instead, the motion Hines filed 
essentially requested a hearing so that Hines could explore 
whether facts existed that would justify a hearing in the first 
place. The hearing, if granted, would have been an open-
ended discovery expedition, unchained to any concrete 
allegation of fact and unguided by any clear principle of law. 
Because Hines did not meet his burden under Voigt, the 
District Court properly exercised its discretion to deny the 
hearing. 
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B. 
Second, Hines’s motion did not ask the District Court 
to rule on any material fact. In the context of a suppression 
motion, a defendant may raise an issue of material fact by 
submitting evidence that, if true, would tend to establish an 
essential element of his or her claim that evidence was 
obtained unconstitutionally. See Voigt, 89 F.3d at 1067. Here 
Hines effectively failed to raise any issue of fact. Further, his 
belated attempt to do so in a reply letter was misdirected 
because not every issue of fact is an issue of material
Hines’s motion agreed with the version of events that 
the government put forward. The motion stated in part: “The 
facts of the police documentation are assumed to be true for 
the purposes of this motion only.” The motion summarized 
the police documentation: 
 fact.  
According to the incident report, Officers Romero and 
Small were “patrolling the area of Nesbitt St. and 
Orange St.” when they observed Mr. Hines 
“attempting to conceal what appeared to be a black 
hand gun in his jacket left pocket.” At that point, 
Officer Romero watched Mr. Hines enter a liquor store 
on Orange Street and called for back-up to meet at 
Nesbitt and Orange Streets. Officer Johnson arrived, 
and he and Officer Romero entered the liquor store and 
located Mr. Hines. They approached Mr. Hines, patted 
him down, and allegedly recovered a gun and bullets. 
(App. 15 (“Motion to Suppress of Jerome Hines”) (internal 
citations to police reports omitted)). 
Hines therefore conceded that, for the purposes of 
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evaluating his motion, the District Court was to treat as true 
the events described in the police report, namely that (1) the 
officers saw Jerome Hines (2) display and then conceal a 
handgun in his pocket, and then (3) walk into a liquor store. 
These statements, if true, support the officers’ conduct 
because they epitomize the essential elements of a 
permissible stop-and-frisk. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 
(1968) (holding that an officer may make “a reasonable 
search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, 
where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an 
armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has 
probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime”). Because 
Hines expressly instructed the District Court to assume those 
statements were true, and because if true they justified the 
officers’ actions, Hines did not dispute the legality of the 
officers’ conduct. Because he did not dispute the events that 
underpinned the legality of the officers’ conduct, he did not 
show that “there [were] disputed issues of material fact which 
[would] affect the outcome of the motion.” Coleman
After Hines filed his motion and the government 
responded, Hines submitted to the District Court a reply 
letter, to which he attached for the first time an affidavit 
tending to refute the police officers’ version of events. The 
officers’ reports stated they saw Hines display a handgun on 
Orange Street, and Hines’s affidavit stated, among other 
things, “At no time on October 23, 2007, did I hold or 
otherwise have a gun in plain sight while on Orange Avenue 
[sic] in Newark.” (App. 62.) Hines contends that, by creating 
conflicting versions of events, the affidavit operated to 
dispute material elements of the officers’ reasonable 
suspicion to detain, and probable cause to search, him. 
, 149 
F.3d at 677. Thus, he failed to raise an issue of material fact. 
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The affidavit failed to create an issue of material fact, 
however, because to do so there must be a claim for the 
evidence to be “material to” in the first place. And, to be 
“material,” a fact must bear upon an essential element of the 
legal claim before the court. In this case, Hines did not assert 
the sine qua non of a suppression motion: he did not assert 
that evidence was so tainted by a constitutional violation that 
it should be suppressed. To be sure, Hines did contend before 
this Court that the affidavit tended to negate the officers’ 
reasonable suspicion to detain him, but the actual text of his 
motion in the District Court failed to challenge the 
government on those points. The statements in Hines’s 
affidavit—though they may have supported a claim that 
evidence should be suppressed—bore no legal relationship to 
the disposition of his motion, because the motion did not ask 
the District Court to suppress the handgun. Simply put, an 
affidavit cannot be material to a claim that is not stated. 
Accordingly, he did not create an issue of material fact. The 
affidavit had no bearing on the question before the District 
Court, and has no bearing on our review of its discretionary 
ruling. Given that there was no material factual dispute to 
resolve, there was no need for an evidentiary hearing. See 
Coleman
We emphasize that the procedure for a defendant who 
seeks an evidentiary hearing on a suppression motion is to 
(1) state a colorable legal claim, (2) identify facts material to 
that claim, (3) show why the facts are disputed, and then 
(4) request a hearing to resolve the dispute. From our analysis 
it does not follow, however, that the District Court could not 
have exercised its discretion to hold a hearing if it wanted to 
do so. We hold only that, given the motion’s defects, the 
, 149 F.3d at 677. The District Court was thus within 
its discretion when it declined to hold one. 
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District Court acted within its discretion when it declined to 
hold a hearing. 
V. 
Hines contends next that the District Court incorrectly 
calculated his criminal history score when it counted his four 
prior convictions under New Jersey Statute § 2C:33-2.1(b) 
(“Loitering for purpose of illegally using, possessing or 
selling controlled substance”). The Sentencing Guidelines 
provide that loitering offenses “and offenses similar to them, 
by whatever name they are known,” shall not be counted in 
determining a defendant’s criminal history score. U.S.S.G. 
§ 4A1.2(c)(2). Hines’s position is that the District Court 
should not have counted his convictions under § 2C:33-2.1(b) 
because they are “similar to” loitering under U.S.S.G. 
§ 4A1.2(c)(2). 
Because the core of our inquiry is whether New Jersey 
Statute § 2C:33-2.1(b) is “similar to” loitering, as the word 
appears in U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c)(2), we begin by examining 
and defining the meaning of each. We then apply a five-part 
balancing test pursuant to a recent amendment by the 
Sentencing Commission and conclude that § 2C:33-2.1(b) is 
not “similar to” loitering, as used in the Guidelines. 
A. 
Four of Hines’s prior convictions are under § 2C:33-
2.1(b), which prohibits “[l]oitering for [the] purpose of 
illegally using, possessing or selling [a] controlled 
substance.” More particularly, the statute provides: 
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A person, whether on foot or in a motor vehicle, 
commits a disorderly persons offense if  
(1) he wanders, remains or prowls in a public place 
with the purpose of unlawfully obtaining or 
distributing a controlled dangerous substance or 
controlled substance analog; and  
(2) engages in conduct that, under the 
circumstances, manifests a purpose to obtain or 
distribute a controlled dangerous substance or 
controlled substance analog. 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:33-2.1(b). The New Jersey statute 
therefore targets “loitering plus”—by which we mean in this 
case loitering combined with the specific intent to obtain or 
distribute a controlled substance unlawfully—and not 
“loitering simpliciter
The word “loitering” in the Guidelines, in contrast, 
refers to loitering 
,” by which we mean simple loitering, 
without qualification. 
simpliciter. We so conclude for three 
reasons. First, the Guidelines’ plain text says only “loitering,” 
and nothing more. § 4A1.2(c)(2). Black’s Law Dictionary 
defines “loitering” as the “criminal offense of remaining in a 
certain place (such as a public street) for no apparent reason.” 
Black’s Law Dictionary 1027 (9th ed. 2009). The Model 
Penal Code’s description is substantially similar: “A person 
commits a violation if he loiters or prowls in a place, at a 
time, or in a manner not usual for law-abiding individuals 
under circumstances that warrant alarm for the safety of 
persons or property in the vicinity.” Model Penal Code 
§ 250.6 (2001). Thus, the plain text of the Guidelines suggests 
that what they describe is loitering simpliciter. 
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Second, the word “loitering” appears in the Guidelines 
among a list predominated by petty status offenses, such as 
hitchhiking, truancy, public intoxication, and vagrancy. This 
strongly suggests that, in drafting the Guidelines, the 
Commission was contemplating loitering in the least-culpable 
sense. See United States v. Martinez
Third, although Hines urges us to treat the word 
“loitering” in the Guidelines as describing more than loitering 
, 905 F.2d 251, 253 (9th 
Cir. 1990) (concluding that § 4A1.2(c)(2) comprises offenses 
of “minor significance”). To read “loitering” to include 
specific intent crimes (such as New Jersey Statute § 2C:33-
2.1(b)) would lend it a meaning disharmonious with its 
statutory context. 
simpliciter, to do so would place us at odds with one of the 
paramount purposes of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 
which is to “provide certainty and fairness in meeting the 
purposes of sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing 
disparities among defendants with similar records.” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 991(b)(1)(B). An analysis that construes the Guidelines’ use 
of “loitering” to embrace more than loitering simpliciter 
would create uncertainty and likely would produce disparate 
results. Our survey of loitering offenses under statutes across 
the country finds a panoply of laws as varied as the reasons 
people loiter. In New York, for example, loitering statutes 
range from loitering to possess or use drugs, N.Y. Penal Law 
§ 240.36 (McKinney 2008), to loitering for prostitution, id. 
§ 240.37. Similarly, in California, to “‘[l]oiter’ means to 
delay or linger without a lawful purpose for being on the 
property and for the purpose of committing a crime as 
opportunity may be discovered.” Cal. Health & Safety Code 
§ 11530. California applies this broad definition in 
prohibiting not only loitering for the purpose of buying or 
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selling controlled substances, id. § 11532, but also loitering 
by minors near gambling establishments, Cal. Bus. & Prof. 
Code § 19921, loitering near posted industrial property, Cal. 
Penal Code § 554, loitering while peering into windows, id. 
§ 647(i), loitering about adult schools, id. § 647b, loitering 
near children’s schools by sex offenders, id. § 653b, loitering 
for prostitution, id. § 653.22(a), loitering in obstruction of 
bicycle pathways, Cal. Veh. Code § 21211(a), and loitering in 
or around public transit facilities, Cal. Pub. Util. Code 
§ 120451. Suffice it to say, to read “loitering” under the 
Guidelines more broadly than the straightforward definition 
implied by the plain text would raise more difficulties than it 
would resolve—a result that would hardly lend “certainty and 
fairness” to our inquiry. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B). In our 
view, the vast array of loitering statutes, and the lack of 
indication that the Commission intended the Guidelines to 
refer to all or any of them, means that the only fair and certain 
way to avoid unwarranted disparities is to hold that the 
Guidelines mean what the Guidelines say: the simple status 
offense of loitering simpliciter
In sum, we conclude that the New Jersey statute 
targets “loitering plus,” in that a person violates it only if he 
“wanders, remains or prowls in a public place” while 
manifesting a specific intent to buy or sell a controlled or 
dangerous substance. “Loitering,” as that term is used in the 
Guidelines, however, means only loitering 
.  
simpliciter
B. 
. A 
person loiters, within the meaning of the Guidelines, merely 
by wandering, prowling, or remaining in a public place.  
Turning to the application of the Guidelines, the 
default rule is that courts, when calculating a criminal history 
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score, should count prior misdemeanor convictions except 
when the Guidelines expressly provide for exclusion. 
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c). To this end, the Guidelines expressly 
list nine types of misdemeanor and petty offenses, stating that 
they, “and offenses similar to them, by whatever name they 
are known, are never counted.” § 4A1.2(c)(2). The list 
includes “[l]oitering.” 
The question in this case turns on “similar to.” 
Id. 
Id. Our 
decision in United States v. Elmore, 108 F.3d 23, 27 (3d Cir. 
1997), has traditionally guided courts in this judicial circuit in 
their analysis of similarity under § 4A1.2(c)(2). In Elmore, 
we were asked to determine whether a defendant’s prior 
convictions for possession of drug paraphernalia, assault, and 
harassment, should have been counted in his criminal history 
score, or whether they were “similar to” disorderly conduct, 
which the Guidelines explain should not be counted. Id. at 25. 
Stating that the “apparent concern of the Guidelines” was that 
courts might count an offense identical to those in the 
enumerated list, merely because the offense happened to go 
by a different name under state law, we held that courts 
should evaluate similarity by looking to the elements of the 
offense itself, rather than simply the name by which it is 
known. Id.
We recognized in 
 at 27. 
Elmore that not all of our sister 
Courts of Appeals shared our approach. We noted that when 
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in United States v. 
Hardeman, 933 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1991), was asked whether 
driving without insurance was “similar to” driving without a 
license, it used a multi-factor approach that looked to “all 
possible factors of similarity,” including the respective 
punishments, levels of culpability involved, and the degree to 
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which commission of the offenses indicated a likelihood of 
recurring criminal conduct. Elmore, 108 F.3d at 27. In a 
similar inquiry, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
considered the Hardeman factors, but emphasized the 
“circumstances surrounding” and the “factual basis for” the 
defendant’s prior conduct, as well as the amount of 
punishment he actually received. United States v. Booker, 71 
F.3d 685, 690 (7th Cir. 1995). The Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit, in contrast, asked whether the conduct 
underlying a prior conviction was “universally regarded as 
culpable,” and whether it was a predictor of recurring 
criminal conduct. United States v. Martinez
In 2007, the Sentencing Commission took note of the 
divergent approaches in the Courts of Appeals and published 
an amendment designed to unify them. The Guidelines now 
prefer 
, 905 F.2d 251, 
254 (9th Cir. 1990). 
Hardeman’s broad, multi-factor approach. U.S.S.G. 
§ 4A1.2 cmt. n.12(A). As framed by the Commission, those 
factors are: “(1) a comparison of punishments imposed for 
listed and unlisted offenses; (2) the perceived seriousness of 
the offense as indicated by the level of punishment; (3) the 
elements of the offense; (4) the level of culpability involved; 
and (5) the degree to which the commission of the offense 
indicates a likelihood of recurring criminal conduct.” Id. Put 
another way, our inquiry is now “Elmore
1. 
-plus,” in that we 
continue to consider the elements of the offenses, but now 
examine four other factors as well. We consider them in turn. 
The Guidelines instruct us to begin by comparing the 
punishments imposed for the offense listed in the Guidelines 
(i.e., “loitering”), and the offense for which the defendant has 
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been convicted (i.e., § 2C:33-2.1(b)). U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 cmt. 
n.12(A)(i). 
Violations of § 2C:33-2.1(b) carry a potential 
punishment of six months in jail and a $1000 fine. N.J. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 2C:43-3(c), 2C:43-8. Simple loitering, however, 
carries no punishment in New Jersey because New Jersey has 
repealed its basic loitering law. See
We agree, but not for the reason the government 
suggests. Section 4A1.2(c)(1) of the Guidelines, which 
precedes the section in which “loitering” appears, explains 
that misdemeanor offenses are not counted unless “the 
sentence was a term of probation of more than one year or a 
term of imprisonment of at least thirty days.” Thus, a 
misdemeanor that might qualify for exclusion nonetheless is 
countable under the Guidelines if it involves more than thirty 
days’ imprisonment or one year of probation. The Guidelines 
therefore suggest that offenses punishable by more than thirty 
days’ imprisonment are not “similar to” offenses punishable 
by thirty days or less.  
 N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 2A:170-1 (repealed Sept. 1, 1979). Because “no 
punishment” is different from “six months in jail and a $1000 
fine,” the government would have us conclude the offenses 
are not similar. 
Because the potential six-month jail sentence for 
violating § 2C:33-2.1(b) is greater than the thirty-day line the 
Commission drew, we conclude § 2C:33-2.1(b) is not 
“similar to” loitering simpliciter
2. 
 under the first factor. 
The Guidelines next instruct us to examine how 
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serious Hines’s prior offenses were, as indicated by the 
punishment he actually received. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 cmt. 
n.12(A)(ii); Hardeman, 933 F.2d at 282 (examining the 
punishment actually imposed for prior offenses). This factor, 
as the government’s brief concedes, redounds in Hines’s 
favor: he received a series of sentences ranging from 10 to 90 
days in jail, all of which were suspended. The light penalties 
imposed for his offenses were therefore highly similar to the 
penalties one would receive for committing the type of minor 
offense that the Guidelines do not count. See
3. 
 § 4A1.2(c)(2). 
The second factor therefore suggests that § 2C:33-2.1(b) is 
“similar to” loitering. 
The third factor under the Guidelines’ five-part inquiry 
requires us to compare the elements of loitering simpliciter 
with the elements of § 2C:33-2.1(b). U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 cmt. 
n.12(A)(iii). Even though New Jersey state law defines 
Hines’s predicate offenses and sentence, the classification of 
each offense as excluded or included under U.S.S.G. 
§ 4A1.2(c) is a matter of federal law. Booker, 71 F.3d at 688-
689. In construing the elements of the respective statutes, we 
therefore interpret New Jersey’s statute according to state law 
and the Guidelines according to federal law. Elmore, 108 
F.3d at 25 (citing Taylor v. United States
New Jersey Statute § 2C:33-2.1(b) targets people who 
loiter in public for the purpose of buying or selling controlled 
or dangerous substances. It requires a specific intent—
subjectively held and objectively manifested—in addition to 
the mere act of wandering, remaining, or prowling in a public 
place. It therefore targets “loitering plus” the specific intent to 
, 495 U.S. 575 
(1990)). 
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engage in a drug crime. 
As we have discussed above, “loitering,” within the 
meaning of the Guidelines, requires no mens rea element at 
all. It is mere loitering simpliciter
Hines makes two arguments to the contrary. The first 
is based on 
, which is little more than 
suspiciously remaining in a public place, and requires no 
specific intent element at all. Given the presence of a specific 
intent element in the New Jersey statute, the elements of the 
offenses are not “similar to” each other for the purposes of 
this portion of the Guidelines’ balancing test. 
City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 57-58 
(1999), in which the Supreme Court acknowledged that state 
courts had “uniformly invalidated” for vagueness laws that 
did not combine loitering simpliciter with some other overt 
act or evidence of criminal intent. Meanwhile, the Guidelines, 
Hines points out, continue to characterize loitering as an 
“offense.” § 4A1.2(c)(2). Hines contends that because simple 
loitering cannot be criminalized after Morales, and because 
the Guidelines are concerned only with “offenses,” the word 
“loitering” in the Guidelines must mean “loitering plus.” 
Under that approach, he urges us to hold that his convictions 
under the New Jersey statute must be “similar to” the 
“offense of” loitering under the Guidelines, and therefore not 
counted in his criminal history score. Although we are aware 
that other Courts of Appeals have been persuaded by this 
argument, e.g., United States v. Lock, 466 F.3d 594, 602 (7th 
Cir. 2006) (holding that after Morales, “loitering” under the 
Guidelines is similar to loitering with intent to purchase or 
sell drugs), we are not. To accept that argument is to accept 
the premise that the 1999 Morales decision changed the 
meaning of the word “loitering” as it was published in the 
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Guidelines in 1987. That we will not do. When the 
Commission described the offense of loitering in 1987, it was 
describing loitering simpliciter; that after Morales statutes 
criminalizing simple loitering may be unconstitutionally 
vague does not change the fact that loitering simpliciter was 
an offense when the Commission drafted the Guidelines. The 
concept the Guidelines described then remains the concept 
they describe now: loitering simpliciter. Cf. Harris v. United 
States, 536 U.S. 545, 556 (2002) (explaining that changes in 
constitutional law do not change the meaning of statutory 
terms). Section 2C:33-2.1(b), which targets conduct 
substantially more culpable than “loitering” as the Guidelines 
employed the term in 1987, contains a specific intent element 
that is absent from loitering simpliciter
He also contends that because § 2C:33-2.1 is similar to 
other loitering statutes in force across the United States, it 
must also be similar to “loitering” as the word appears in the 
Guidelines. Hines misapprehends the relevant question, 
however, which is one of federal—not state—law. 
. We remain convinced 
that this renders them dissimilar under this portion of our 
inquiry. 
See 
Elmore, 108 F.3d at 25. Even if it were true that § 2C:33-2.1 
is “similar to” all state loitering statutes across the country 
(and we have our doubts), it would not follow that the New 
Jersey statute is “similar to” what the Guidelines mean, as a 
matter of federal law. What Hines must show under this 
portion of the balancing test is that the elements of the New 
Jersey state statute are similar to the elements of the federal 
definition of loitering simpliciter
In sum, because the elements of § 2C:33-2.1(b) 
. State statutes from other 
jurisdictions cannot help him to do so. 
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include a specific intent element that is absent from the non-
culpable status crime described by loitering simpliciter
4. 
, we 
hold that the elements of § 2C:33-2.1(b) are not “similar to” 
the elements of loitering under the Guidelines. 
We next turn to a comparison of the level of 
culpability involved when loitering in violation of § 2C:33-
2.1(b) versus “loitering” as the Guidelines use the term. 
§ 4A1.2 cmt. n.12(A)(iv).  
Culpability is another way of describing the mens rea a 
statute requires of each material element of an offense. See 
United States v. Zats, 298 F.3d 182, 189 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(describing mens rea as comprising “level[s] of culpability”); 
Black’s Law Dictionary 435 (9th ed. 2009) (citing Model 
Penal Code § 2.02 (2001)). Courts of Appeals in other circuits 
generally hold that if the mens rea of two offenses are 
divergent, the offenses are not similar. E.g., United States v. 
Hernandez-Hernandez, 431 F.3d 1212, 1222 (9th Cir. 2005). 
This is consistent with our own decision in Elmore, in which 
we held that if the mens rea elements of two offenses are 
dissimilar, so too are the offenses themselves. Elmore, 108 
F.3d at 25. We must therefore compare the mens rea required 
to violate § 2C:33-2.1(b) with the mens rea requirement of 
loitering simpliciter
In this case, loitering 
. 
simpliciter requires merely being 
in a public place with no apparent purpose. Black’s Law 
Dictionary 1027 (9th ed. 2009). It therefore has no specific 
intent. In contrast, § 2C:33-2.1(b) requires waiting in a public 
place with the specific purpose and intent to buy, sell, or 
possess controlled substances. The New Jersey statute thus 
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contains a specific intent element that distinguishes it from 
loitering simpliciter
5. 
. Accordingly, we conclude that the 
culpability requirements are divergent enough to render the 
offenses dissimilar under this portion of the Guidelines’ 
balancing test. 
The final factor the Guidelines ask us to consider is the 
degree to which Hines’s convictions under § 2C:33-2.1(b) 
indicate a likelihood of recurring criminal conduct. U.S.S.G. 
§ 4A1.2 cmt. n.12(A)(v). 
Because a primary goal of the Guidelines is to reduce 
recidivism, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2), the more a violation 
indicates recurring criminal conduct, the more likely the 
Guidelines are to include it in a prior history score. 
Accordingly, the less a violation of § 2C:33-2.1(b) indicates 
recurring criminal conduct, the more likely it is “similar to” a 
non-countable offense like loitering simpliciter
A significant part of § 2C:33-2.1(b) addresses 
controlled substances. It is, in essence, a drug statute—
indeed, one cannot violate the statute without objectively 
manifesting a subjective intent to purchase or sell controlled 
substances. The Sentencing Commission has determined that 
convictions for crimes involving illegal narcotics correlate 
strongly to recidivism. 
.  
See U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, 
Measuring Recidivism: The Criminal History Computation of 
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 13, 29-30 (2004) (finding 
that 21.2% of defendants sentenced for drug trafficking 
recidivate). Hines thus stands convicted under a statute that 
targets people who intend to buy or sell controlled substances, 
and the Sentencing Commission has indicated that such 
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people, once convicted, tend to recidivate. This leads us to 
conclude, based on the Guidelines, that a violation of 
§ 2C:33-2.1(b) “indicates a likelihood of recurring criminal 
conduct,” § 4A1.2 cmt. n.12(A)(v), a conclusion which finds 
support in Hines’s very status as a five-time repeat offender 
under this statute alone. 
On balance, of the five factors set out in Hardeman and 
endorsed by the Sentencing Commission, only one—the 
degree of punishment Hines received for his violations—
suggests that his offenses are “similar to” loitering. That is 
not enough in this case to overcome the other four. We hold 
that § 2C:33-2.1(b) is not “similar to” loitering under the 
Guidelines, which describe loitering simpliciter
* * * * * 
. Accordingly, 
we will affirm the District Court’s application of the 
Guidelines. 
The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed. 
 
